Those gone by choice or fate, in life or in death, shall be irrevocably and deeply intertwined with those for whom mortal, earthly existence is, was, but one dimension. The visceral is brought to life with unimaginable magnitude wheresoever the slightest provocation is permitted entry. A sight, a sound, a scent, a word like an avalanche brings him to life. It is only in that insufferable state of oppression that he dies a sure and nasty death.


“Wakefulness and Obsession: An Interview with E. M Cioran”


An interesting interview that captures the inner toils that speak to the fervent authenticating experience of writing – eunoia. He writes: “A writer who is not in some way ill is for me almost automatically a writer of the second rank.” He shrank from philosophy in early life finding there was nothing of use to him to be found in their works. Eliade, had written scathingly of his first publication. Ceaselessly adept to crises of spirit, faith, or a crisis of faith, never found him as such. But it would not be arguments that would ever change his comportment, alter his ways, move him, but exhaustion.

He says: “I am actually less a passionate than a possessed type. In all things I must go to the end of possibility and it is not, finally, arguments that convince me to change my mind, but only exhaustion, that which is exhausted by passion. (This has connections with faith.) Because of this, personal encounters, seemingly small things in my life were full of decided significance. I was always very receptive to them; I have always, for example, spoken to strangers and many an encounter has given me a great deal. I have above all a weakness for people who are slightly disturbed. In Rumania, in Sibiu, a city with at least 60,000 inhabitants, I knew in one way or the other all the knocked-about people. The poets, too, who of course belong with them! The morbid attracts me, but morbid, what does that mean, anyway? ”

Failure, hopelessness, the disturbed, all seemed to come to his mortal wake not to console but to disrupt until all would fall to the hillside; negation then. And he speaks of that man, who had a tremendous impact on him: “He was not at all an evil man, no scoundrel, absolutely not, but someone to whom it was plainly impossible to have even the smallest illusion about anything whatsoever. This is also a form of knowing, for what is knowing finally but putting something in question? That kind of knowing, that understanding that pushes too far, is dangerous. Basically – I speak of life as it is and not of abstract philosophical constructs – life is only bearable because one does not go to the end; doing something is only possible when one has particular illusions and that holds also for friendships, for everything. The most perfect consciousness, absolute lucidity, is nothingness. And this fellow was driven to that point.”

It is then in that subterranean voice, negligent to the philosopher of abstract ideas, as well as formulae, and articulations of grand speaking truths. For he says: “As a rule, we know only the surface from our actions, only that which is formulated. But what is far more important is just that which cannot be formulated, the implicit, the secret behind an utterance, what is hidden therein. On that account, all judgments of others as well as those about the self are partially wrong. For the deepest part is hidden, but it is the more actual, the essential in humans and at the same time the most difficult of access. Novels often give one the best possibility to transpose oneself, to express without explaining oneself. The truly great writers are, in my view, those who have a feel for the subterranean; I am thinking above all of Dostoïevski. He is interested in everything that is deep and apparently lowly, though it is not lowly, but tragic. The great novelists are the true psychologists. I know many people who have written novels and have failed at it. Even Eliade wrote several novels and he failed. Why? Because he could only reproduce superficial phenomena, without translating them from the depths, from the source. The source of an emotion is very difficult to grasp, but it comes to just that. That holds for all phenomena, for faith, etc. Why did it begin, how did it develop? and so forth – only he who has the gift of divination can perceive where it really comes from. But it is not accessible to reflection. Dostoïevski is the only one who has pushed forward to the source of human dealings.” And further: “the psychoanalyst wants to heal, but I seek for something quite different. I want to grasp the daemonic in mankind. What the secret of one’s life is, one does not know oneself. This very secrecy, on the other hand, creates meaning in life, out of the communication between people. And if this were not the case, it would merely be a perpetual dialogue between marionettes. I would say that it revolves around the right tone; each person has a certain tone in everything that he does.”

He is not a puppet to positivity and whatever trending, consoling, modalities sought to explain away human suffering. He marvelled at the exasperating destitute of lived life, perhaps a marvel is more fitting, for he feared not to look without complacencies into that ontic mirror that might restore him from inevitable self-destruction. He is not for or of the feeble simple-minded, nor still the seekers of Truth in composure, quietude, and self-containment. It is the whirly winds of Aeolus that twist, garble, and undercut the Word from which we, as with Sisyphus, shall crawl out from beneath bearing a weight of perpetual struggle.

“A person who tells me that music means nothing to him is straight-away liquidated for me. It is something very serious for me, for music stirs that most intimate region in human beings.Bach is a god to me. Someone who does not understand Bach is lost; it is actually unimaginable, though it does happen. I believe that music is the only branch of art that has the capacity to construct a deep complicity between two human beings. Not poetry, only music. Someone who is insensitive to music suffers from an enormous handicap. That is simply the case and it is completely normal for music to construct a bond between people. It is unthinkable that they hear anything by Schumann or Bach, anything that they love, without being stirred. But I can understand how someone might dislike this or that poet.”

My mother, as a music therapist, would have appreciated this. That inter-dialogical affair mobilized musically amidst kindred spirits verbosely denied is omnipresent when heard.

The Best of Bach

Wakefulness and Obsession: An Interview with E. M Cioran

Wakefulness and Obsession: An Interview with E.M. Cioran Author(s): MICHEL JAKOB, E.M. Cioran and Kate Greenspan Source: Salmagundi, No. 103 (SUMMER 1994), pp. 122-145 Published by: Skidmore College

Find YOUR Truth

Version 2Death comes to us all.

As news feeds fill with the demise of Robin Williams the realization that even the most humorous suffer the toils of life overwhelms. I cannot know the preponderance of misery that befell this man, but I know of human suffering.

Have I had a bad life?

Has Robin Williams?

Money? Fame? Success? Family?

All of this wasn’t enough?

Maybe he suffered great trauma as a child?



But perhaps not. I believe it was Charlie Chaplin who said, “to truly laugh, you must be able to take your pain, and play with it,” but I could be wrong. I think his point is that life is tragically comical. We invest time trying to answer the whys and hows, as if we could arrest the twists and turns of life events.

If somehow they could be contained by human – oh, so human – understanding, I could rest…peacefully.

What a great equalizer human understanding can be. To generate a playing field so ripe in reason must be the most laughable invention known to man! Accepting that things happen, happen to me, with no rhyme, or reason; that’s simply unacceptable!

He didn’t just leave me.

I didn’t just quit my job.

She was not just tragically taken (from me).

War zones don’t just occur.

Droughts don’t just happen.

Earthquakes don’t just take millions.

There are reasons for all of this!

There is the scientific variety.

There is the religious variety.

There is the psychological variety.

Whichever paradigm one gravitates to reasons are by default the method by which human understanding explains, justifies (category mistake!) the freak of circumstance that is otherwise unfathomable.

Why is this unfathomable?

Kierkegaard, Sartre, Nietzsche et al. They knew why.

If not for reason, then for what?

The answer? For NOTHING!

What??!!! NOTHING!

Where does this leave us?

The paradox? With human understanding!

What is the meaning of this?!

Finally a good question.

Immersed in self-doubt over this narrative, self-awareness is raw with potential.

God is dead, exclaimed Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. But you suspected this all along.

If God is dead who, what, will keep everything from falling a part? Will causal events no longer be ordered by His will? Is there no agenda albeit hidden from humanity upon which we can hang our moral hat?

Don’t despair. Well actually do. For in despair there is abundance!

No longer looking outwardly for cause and reason, the journey is inwardly enveloped.

No longer enslaved by reason – for some personified as God’s will, for others as the modern God, Science and yet others it appears as Justice – the freedom felt is both frightening and exhilarating.

For now there is an infinite stream of waters to traverse. Do not worry that the wind shall be your master. Cast your sails and chart you course. And on this voyage do not endeavor to look beyond what the eyes can see.

A passage from Blindness –by Jose Saramago – (fitting, you say?) comes to mind: “If you can see, look. If can look, observe.” (Yes, yes, this is out of context!)

And what then of human suffering?

Were it not for the flood of feeds regarding the passing of the beloved Robin Williams, death, rather her contemplation, would not have reached my consciousness.

Contemplating death, the finality of life suddenly appears like a spoiled child demanding attention.

Why must she cry so?, banging her little fists against the ground. Why does the ground disappear with each sounding blow? Why does she look out onto the world demanding that her suffering be taken away?

Here lies the tragedy of human existence!

The ultimate life affirming force is in despairing over the understanding of ourselves as castaways who must conjure meaning by planting invisible roots.

Those who suffer greatly, live extra-ordinarily. They laugh laudably.


The Unfolding of Being – Parmenides

*Pirocacos, Elly. The Pedagogic Mission. Rowman & Littlefield, Lexington Series, pp. 39-49.

Parmenides’s poem divides in three. Firstly, the proem[i] is a lengthy allegorized drama of cryptic literary references with philosophically substantive directives. Subsequent divisions consist of two related yet seemingly antithetical parts. The first, Alitheia[ii], is presented as the Way of “Truth”[iii]. Fragments 2-7 provide a preliminary conclusion, which is expanded in a series of deductive arguments throughout fragment 8 that ends with Being[iv]. The second, Doxa[v], depicts the Road of Opinion traversed by mortals, notably Parmenides and his reader. The antithetical structure of the poem is echoed in the words spoken by the unnamed goddess in the proem, which inaugurates the journey. She says:

It is no ill chance, but justice and right that has sent thee forth to travel on this way. Far indeed does it lie from the beaten track of men! Meet it thou shouldst learn all things, as well as the unshaken heart of persuasive truth, as the opinions of mortals in which there is no true reliance at all. Yet none the less shalt thou learn of these things also, since thou must judge approvedly of the things that seem to men as thou goest through all things in thy journey.[vi]

The didactic import of this journey pivots on the dialectal context here evoked and the promise that the neophyte shall learn many things. In the care of an unnamed goddess—anyone amongst the numerous temptresses of Olympus—the neophyte’s travel does not preclude the opinions of his fellowman. Ascending to the heights of the gods the neophyte shall learn two things: both alitheia as well as the opinions of mortals for which ‘he must judge approvedly’. The view advocating a rigid division between the two worlds and the implicit rejection of all empirical beliefs is not reflected in this passage. It is not that the conclusion is counter-intuitive but, in as much as the journey of enlightenment is a possibility at all, it involves being addressing itself constitutively and concretely. The parody of Being as some insular, intellectualized entity, distinct from the act of understanding, falls outside of the ontological landscape. The journey is a human voyage of existential import that relays a passage from a state of being in and amongst the comforts of one’s ordinary life to a state of being more fully cognizant of one’s predicament. The break commonly attributed to the epistemological status of the objects of inquiry (i.e. truth attends upon being all by itself in virtue of itself versus sensory perceptions attending upon being and not-being) confuses what is, in fact, a manifest ontological rupture where the neophyte is ripped from a set of structures informed by the activities in which his daily interactions are embedded. This set of structures for the most part remains unaccompanied by a subjective state actively involved in the specificity of the activities. The absence of purposive self-awareness synchronizes with the words of admonition Heraclitus embroiders into sayings such as “every beast is driven to pasture by blows”[vii] and “fools when they do hear are like the deaf, of them, does the saying bear witness that they are absent when present”.[viii] An altered state of being involves the unfolding of being as a process of self-appropriation. This works well with Parmenides when interpretation is careful to recognize that the traveller is not simply relaying the story of truth aimed at establishing the underlying essence of reality or the principles of human understanding. It is not a question of either looking outward or inward, for this fundamental break between what can be disclosed to or is internally related to the subject and what is not in the subject or exists and is understood independently of any disclosure to the subject is anachronistic at best.[ix] Any kind of separation that readers discern is not one where the thinking subject transcends his concrete experience of himself, though certainly the ascent motions to self-conscious awareness of his concrete experience of himself. If this is a journey of enlightenment, then the expression “self-transparency” aptly relays what common forms of self-transcendence misconstrue. This is not an emancipatory project where one becomes free from the bondage of a world or state of being in the world that one can comfortably step in and out of. The place of ascent is the familiar land of anthropomorphic gods and the journey is a turbulent struggle that finds the neophyte adrift from familiar comforts. Embedded in activities defined by one’s surroundings one is lost to self, invisible, except through the social roles and practices dictated by one’s surroundings. The ascent therefore motions to a reflective awareness of one’s being not distinct from the so-called foreign world of sensory perception but from that which is beyond, which requires the reassembly of the self through an act of disruption.

Agreeing with Heidegger, alitheia is badly translated as “truth” for, in effect, it conceals the Greek experience replacing it with a contending history. Heidegger traces the etymology of the term, and though I will not reiterate or completely endorse his view, two points are particularly deserving of attention: truth is unconcealedness and the character of unconcealedness is conflictual.[x] The word Alitheia is comprised of the prefix α, equivelant to the English un, and according to the Lidell-Scott dictionary[xi] the word λήθη is derived from λήθω or λανθάνω meaning “to escape notice, to be unknown, or forgotten”, ultimately a kind of concealedness. From this Heidegger composes the somewhat awkward but insightful unconcealedness. Unconcealedness implies a prior state of concealedness insinuating semantic hues foreign to the discordant “truth” inclusive of ‘veiling, masking, covering as well as conserving, preserving, holding back, entrusting and appropriating’. The prefix “un” also implies a privatio, or deprivation as Heidegger calls it, suggesting a further nuance that finds concealedness as that which is taken away, cancelled, evicted or banned. The truth as a-litheia is ultimately something negative: the absence of concealment. Unconcealedness is therefore in some sort of oppositional relation to concealment, which is unlike the word “truth” that bears no relationship to its counter word “falsehood”. Truths correspond to how things really are and falsehoods do not; something is either true or false (The Law of Non-contradiction and the Law of the Excluded Middle). Heidegger puts it best when he says, “un-concealedness belongs to the realm where concealment and concealing occur” and yet, “on the other hand, un-concealedness makes manifest a conflictual essence; i.e. it is unconcealing when in it something comes to pass that is in conflict with concealment”.[xii] The negation, as it were, of Alitheia, is of course, λαθόν, and λανθάνομαι but also ψεῦδος. Heidegger’s analysis offers an interesting analytic twist. Though ψεῦδος has an etymologically distinct root, the counter essence of alitheia, unconcealnedness, is juxtaposed with “the concealed” and hence must be seen alongside that word in Greek which indicates falsity, or the untrue: ψεῦδος. However, the usage of the term ψεῦδος as the counter essence of alitheia must also contend with its obvious semantic opposite: ἀψευδές, the true. In turn λανθάνω or concealedness must be determined on the basis of ψεῦδος or falsity, in which case if concealedness permeates the essence of unconcealedness, then the enigma—what I have called the analytic twist—arises such that the Greek essence of truth receives it character from the essence of falsity.[xiii] From this, the second instructional point is revealed as a form of struggle for “the truth is never “in itself”, “available by itself”, but instead must be gained by struggle. Unconcealedness must be wrested from concealment”.[xiv] Returning for a moment to the meaning of λανθάνω, “to escape notice”, Heidegger draws attention to the usage of the term in Homer where the meaning suggests that “‘being concealed’ is an essential feature of the appearances of being”[xv] which he suggests is expressed with greater clarity in the well known Epicurean proverb “λάθε βιώσσας” meaning “be concealed in the way you conduct your life”.[xvi] This is a particularly important move since it implicates humankind such that the concealed and unconcealed show up as characters of the very being itself rather than as characteristics of the noticing or apprehending. Clearly, the distinction pivots on understanding something escaping someone’s notice versus being concealed to others as something-or-other.[xvii] Finally, Heidegger returns to the common Greek saying λανθάνομαι which now translates as “I am concealed from myself in relation to something which would otherwise be unconcealed to me.” The idea bears a similarity to the notion of “forgetting” when one considers that “the being sinks away into concealment in such a manner that with this concealment of the being I remain concealed from myself. Moreover, this concealment is itself concealed”.[xviii] Forgetting involves something slipping us. But because this something also falls into concealment, we also fall into concealedness in relation to the forgotten. And hence we are rendered invisible unto self. This invisibility brought on as a kind of forgetting Heidegger calls “the oblivion of Being” which he says may remain forever unbreached or perhaps

It could be with a view to this forgottenness of Being a remembering might awaken, one thinking of Being itself and nothing else, considering Being in its truth, and thinking the truth of Being and not only, as in all metaphysics, beings with respect to their Being. For this there would be required, before all else, an experience of the essence of forgetting, of that which is concealed on the essence of ἀλήθεια. The Greeks experienced forgetting as a coming to pass of concealment.[xix]

This reference to the “oblivion of being” is expounded in Heidegger’s Being and Time. The phraseology adopted rests on a negative moment in the history of philosophy or metaphysics—beginning with Plato and Aristotle—whereupon the fundamental difference between Being and beings is eroded into forgottenness or more precisely the “forgottenness of being”. At least since the time of Plato epistemology and metaphysics has moved comfortably within the understanding that the thinking subject and the objects of the world belong to two distinct realms. Being, for instance Plato’s Forms, shows up as the basic ontological constituents of the world in and of themselves, or in virtue of themselves entirely abstracted, distinct from the thinking subject. Indeed, according to certain interpretations, Plato believed these Ideas to reside in the World of Intelligibility beyond the World of Appearance. This left him the task of explaining how the thinking subject could become acquainted with these Forms and hence be said to have knowledge. This divide has been past down through the history of philosophy having acquired numerous variations, but the separation in whatever form, prompts the need for a bridge—between the subject and object—to accommodate the possibility of human knowledge of the external world. It is to this divide that Heidegger speaks as the beginning of the end of metaphysics or the “oblivion of being”. The divide has been at the cost of Being, specifically as what Heidegger calls Dasein—the term he uses for the kind of being humans are—so that all efforts have been transposed to the act of forgetting, literally removing, abstracting, the presence of Being. Reverting back to the PreSocratics, and most particularly Parmenides, a process of remembering when this divide was not entertained is recollected.

Though it is certainly possible to objectify the entities that make up the tapestry of “reality” this attitude that finds the thinking subject looking in at the world as something distinct from Being is not primordial. We are, as it were, primordially beings-in-the-world-with-others; we are, in effect, coping beings. Prior to any categories of reflection making their way into our thinking, Heidegger’s carefully articulated and exceedingly complex exegesis can be simplified. As with all cases of simplification, important nuances will be lost in my treatment of Heidegger, which I hope readers will forgive on account of my desire to make a specific point. That point is that we are already in the world, oriented towards it unreflectively, living our roles in the world in a manner of investedness or “care”. The danger of this unreflective life, of course, is also described as a kind of forgetfulness, which conforms to what I take Parmenides’s men of doxa to suffer from. This state is described as the “unownedness of being”. It is essentially what sociologists describe as conformism, but which here shows up more starkly than a mere social phenomenon; it is constitutively and concretely, or inescapably part of the human experience. Still this kind of default absorption, when understood in counter distinction to “ownedness”, marks an important distinction in the disclosedness of ‘Dasein as the being that comports itself towards entities as entities’. The vocabulary, though dense, can be helpful to the novice in the context of our discussion: the disclosure of unownedness is publicness whereas ownedness is resoluteness. In this default mode Heidegger speaks of disclosure to an already structured world to which we unreflectively respond as “anyone”. By this I take him to mean that Dasein is acclimatized to the world, even if unthinkingly. So one employs the complex hyper-hyphenated neologisms because that is what one who writes within the Heideggerian tradition does, I wear black at a funeral because that is what one does, I talk in front of the classroom to address my students because that is what one does. Yet in this mode of being it is easy to discern a sense of invisibility of self, comported towards the world as if everything fits into some functional, pre-defined order into which one “falls”, as it were, or follows, as if an automaton. Like a wheel finding its place on the axle of a carriage, Dasein falls in line, follows suit, and assumes one’s place on an axis of social living. Publicly disclosed thus, the mode of Dasein is unownedness. Even though Dasein is inescapably mine—simply because each person’s life belongs to oneself. We say: this is my life, my responsibility, my decision—it is only in the mode of ownedness that one breaks with this routine of public ownership. If I’m permitted a wordplay, Dasein comes to be resolutely or authentically defined. Anxiety or angst is the word Heidegger employs to talk about this mood of dis-ease felt in the realization that there is no preordained manner of living, no way of comporting oneself in the world that is more valuable than any other. Put simply, there is no right way of living. The investedness of all one’s activities comes to a grinding halt as one struggles with the realization that in the absence of any “right” way, nothing makes sense or means anything anymore. Yet with this despair and profound rupture in the way one lives, one experiences the overwhelming meaningfulness of the meaninglessness of being. As Heidegger puts it, “Anticipation utterly individualizes Dasein, and allows it, in this individualization of itself, to become certain of the totality of its potentiality-for-Being”[xx]. Herman Philipse puts it succinctly:

Heidegger claims that in confronting one’s Self in Angst, we do not reveal ourselves in our reliance on our cultural world, but, on the contrary, in a radical individuality (Vereinzelung). Because of the very fact that in Angst the meaningful world collapses, we cannot flee from ourselves into this world and into the They anymore, and our Dasein stands naked, as it were. We realize that we are “thrown” into existence and that we have freely to construct our existence by ourselves and to choose our course in life. …Authenticity then consists in a radical affirmation of our existential solitude. …authenticity at first sight seems to consist in a complete autonomy of Self, in which the individual does not rely on his cultural background except in the sense that he freely chooses the possibilities he wants to realize.[xxi]

Taking responsibility for all that one is, owning up to who one is without recourse to contingencies that befall everyone and anyone, one must now struggle to reaffirm oneself as one’s ownmost possibility. Emphasis is not on the “factical” circumstances external and internal to one’s being, but to the manner of negotiating these circumstances. “One” circumvents the structural order that in default mode meaningfully transcribes how “one” is to respond to a particular circumstance.

This Hero’s journey is something of an experience of forgetting, at least insofar as the movement gestures to the youthful hero’s passage from his socially acquired niche into a demonic world of unknown darkness that presses in on her inner most human concern over her fate in the world. Everyday life could be described as “uneventful”, or what Heidegger calls ‘a steady flow of skillful activity’ where one is unreflectingly oriented in response to one’s sense of the situation. When coping is uninterrupted one is completely absorbed by the situation—experience flows as it were—so that one has no experience of a self causing the activity. This passage, what I call an ontological rupture, interrupts this flow and sets the hero well on his way to an authentic—Heidegger’s “ownedness”—and “resolute” re-instantiation of self in the world.

The inaugural words of the proem are echoed in the preliminaries found in fragments 2 and 6. Of the three ways only the third, the way of not-being, is rejected as utterly unspeakable, unknowable and hence unviable. The way of mortals, misleadingly delineated the Way of Appearance, we are forewarned not to travel because—and Parmenides’s point is conditional:

with wandering thought in their breasts, men are bourn along stupefied like men deaf and blind. Undiscerning crowds, in whose eyes the same and not the same is and is not, and all things travel in opposite directions!

We can speculate that the world here described is altering and, according to what I have referred to as the Orthodox interpretation, involves thinking in contradiction, which is simply rejected as false. Instead, the descriptor seems to make a point about mortals and not the so-called objects of thought or even the formulation of thought. “With wandering in their breasts”; “stupefied like men deaf and blind”; “undiscerning crowds”; “in whose eyes the same and not the same is and is not”—these all consistently make the point that their Being and the being of beings is lost on them. They are in a state of oblivion; unreflectively wandering amid the crowds without conscious directedness. And even though this may be a default state of being, it is nonetheless neither a permanent nor the desirable state of being. Of them Heidegger states,

mortals accept whatever is immediately, abruptly, and first of all offered to them. They never concern themselves about preparing a path for thought. They never really hear the call of the disclosure of the duality. They keep to what is unfolded in the twofold, and only to that aspect which immediately makes a claim upon mortals; that is, they keep to what is present without considering presencing”. They take this to be what is unconcealed, ἀληθή (VIII, 39), or it really does appear to them and is thus something revealed.[xxii]

This, thinking ahead to Campbell’s Monomyth, I understand as presence-to-self in and amongst the ordinary and commonplace. As if severed from a pseudo sense of ontological permanence, as a child to his mother, one pushes forward, which implies a sense of futurity, to face what was previously unrevealed, masked, unattainable, or simply beyond one’s reach. This sense of transition resembles a rite of passage, which Campbell documents as involving a Call to Adventure where the comfort of the neophyte’s banal existence is left behind as she prods into the clutches of the unknown where she must confront great challenges. This is not merely a reflection of social patterns of human behavior. These movements, this rite of passage, reflect something fundamental to human experience.


[i] Barnes recognizes only the obvious aspect of the proem, namely that it proposes a journey of enlightenment, and argues that the only further aspect of philosophical importance in the proem occupies lines 30-32 where the goddess promises to teach Parmenides both the well-rounded way of truth, and the unreliable opinions of mortals. For Barnes’ viewpoint see Barnes, Presocratic Philosophers, 155-175. However, for readings which favor the view that the proem is rich in philosophical content, see Burnet, Greek Philosophy: From Thales to Plato; Mackenzie “Parmenides’s Dilemma”; Kahn, “The Thesis of Parmenides.”

[ii] For an explicit exposition of the view that Parmenides’s poem is concerned with the problem of knowledge, and specifically the problem of the search for knowledge, rather than cosmogony; and that this is made lucidly clear from the start, namely in the proem, see Kahn, op. cit., 704-6.

[iii] Since Heidegger’s deconstruction of the term Alitheia, its translation as “truth” is said to already imply an entire tradition of philosophical discourse which Heidegger rejects. Accepting this, commentators often either leave Alitheia untranslated or transliterated, as with dis-closure or unconcealedness, which is supposed to announce its etymology.

[iv] Radical monism is the acknowledged position inferred at the end of fragment 8. It is, however, controversial whether Parmenides actually argued for numerical—this is the view which is traditionally provided in introductory texts—predicative, or material monism, or indeed a combination of any of these. For a discussion outlining these three kinds of monistic possibilities see Curd, “Parmenidean Monism”. See also Gomperz, Greek thinkers: A History of Ancient Philosophy, where he argues that the implied material monism of preceding cosmologists is extended by Parmenides by logical argument to include predicative monism as well.

[v] It has been argued from antiquity (see Plutarch and Simplicius in his Physics 38.248) until the present day that the Way of Opinion or Doxa corresponds to the second of the two promised things that the goddess will teach, namely the “deceitful opinions of mortal men”. As a result the second part of Parmenides’s poem, The Way of Opinion, is often thought to represent the Way of Falsity. Those who understand the fruitfulness of taking such a journey argue instead that it is the Way of Plausibility.

[vi] Parmenides, On Nature, trans. John Burnet, original Greek text Diels. Source http://philoctetes.free.fr/parmenides.htm.

Compare Heidegger’s translation: For it is no ill fate that has sent you ahead to travel on this way—and truly this way is apart from  men, outside their (trodden) path-but, rather, rule and order. There is, however, a need that you experience everything, both the stable heart of well-enclosing unconcealment, as well as the appearing, in its appearance to mortals, where there is no relying on the unconcealed. Also this, however, you will learn to experience: how the appearing (in the need) remains called upon to be apparent, while it shines through everything and (hence) in that way brings everything to perfection.

[vii] Fragment 11.

[viii] Fragment 34.

[ix] Ibid., 4.

[x] Heidegger, Parmenides, especially 1-28.

[xi] Lidell and Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon.

[xii] Heidegger, 1992, op cit., 18.

[xiii] Heidegger, 1991, 20.

[xiv] Ibid., 17.

[xv] Ibid., 23.

[xvi] Ibid., 24.

[xvii] Heidegger cites a passage alongside its most regular translation and the more accurate intent of its meaning. ἐνθ᾽ ἄλλους μἐν πἀντας ἐλἀνθανε δἀκρυα λεἰβων, Ἀλκίνοος δέ μιν οῖος ἐπεφράσατ ἠδ᾽ένόησενἤμενος ἄγχ᾽αὐτοῦ,Commonly translated “To all the guests he concealed his flowing tears”, replaced by Heidegger’s “but then in relation to all others he was concealed as the one shedding tears”. More in line with naturally linguistic forms of expression he says, it would be more correct to say: “Odysseus, unnoticed by the others, she tears”. But in Greek this is reversed where the sentence pivots on being concealed rather than others not noticing. Op cit., 1992, 23.

[xviii] Op. cit., 24.

[xix] Op cit., p. 28. The following footnote is offered: “Being and Time is the first attempt to think Being itself out of the basic experience of the oblivion of Being. I.e., it is an attempt to prepare this thinking, to pave the way for it, even at risk of remaining on a “path leading nowhere” [“Holzweg”].”

[xx] Heidegger, Being and Time, 310.

[xxi] Philipse, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation, 28.

[xxii] Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, 99.

Naysayers, be gone…

Thus Spoke Zarathustra: The Dance Song

Nietzsche might have been heard saying that! But what of it? It’s not the kind of proverbial bullshit one can include in a 5-step program (or 6 or 7 or however many, dude!) towards happiness or enlightenment or authenticity, or whatever trending name it is given to cushion itself nicely in your little paradigm of meaning. It’s fucking hard work, an on-going, subversive and necessarily disruptive process. Is it quietude you seek? Is it a quiet life you want? (not the same as quietude, dude!) Is it a simple life you want? Is it a life that makes sense, you seek? Is it order and communitarianism, that will appease you? Is it a moralized life, set against unflinching standards you have come to call universal and your own, that you speak to you? Awesome. I almost envy the tyranny of your heart! See the “sense” in it all; I do! But what a pandemic that underlays the cowardice, the fear, the disenchanted, the cave-dwellers, the politically correct, the straight and narrow! Hallelujah, I shall sing and praise you to every corner of the Earth, if you should so as much as risk yourself, at the peril of your existential abyss; if you should choose it so, knowing it, in that moment of concretized singularity, as precarious as any other ventured choice you could have made!


My Way


The high road is feigned the road of the righteous, the fair, the just, the good. The fair, the just, the good, in turn, are feigned the rational, the sound, the balanced, the temperate. What a wondrous uncompromising, and deliciously ordered world this must be. How delightful to walk the straight and narrow line where existential spillage is negligent. There is an abundance of metaphysics chiming in to plot the landscape to settle this path. Kant? Spinoza? Mill? Rand? Epictetus? Epicurus? Plato? Aristotle? Hobbes? Nietzsche? Sartre? de Beauvoir? Foucault? Levinas? Who shall we call upon? The Buddha? Christ? The Church Fathers? Zen Masters? No one; and everyone!

My way is often touted as nonconformist, counter-cultural, defiant, adversarial, non-compliant, dis-obedient; and yet, contrariety to commonplace, dominant paradigms is rarely received with such admiration when it is contrary, and indignantly contra your own! Yet, how one delights in the authenticating experience, shouting how often the debris leaves sufferers in the wake that seemingly aim to inauthenticate your existential expedition! Ach, my contrariety! My wake, my awaking, and ultimate demise! Nietzsche knew this. He also knew the process of ‘becoming who he really is’  involves shattering and shedding ambivalent suitors. In his case, Schopenhauer, Wagner, Montaigne, and without a doubt, Socrates. Nietzsche’s persistent love-hate relationship with Socrates may very well speak to pedagogic “ideals” as those that don’t simply, and narrowly inculcate contra-rational forms of living, or those that seek comportment in “self-mastery” or a self-legislating will, opening the flood-gates to the instincts, but to an unrest, dis-tranquilization of the spirit in resting too comfortably, whereby one’s concretized comportment gives way to that authorial chair of authority abstractly sitting overhead and delegating one’s will. It is, as Nietzsche has put it, “Those who do not wish to belong to the mass need only cease taking themselves easily (my italics); let them follow their conscience, which calls them: ‘Be yourself! All that you are now doing, thinking, desiring is not you yourself” (Untimely Meditations, III: I, I: 338). Giving style to one’s character involves not suppressing or dismissing (the instinct to) the rational, but recognizing the tyranny of reason as the supreme human instinct that would expunge, that would sooner castrate and de-aestheticized the human experience, than permit it loss to socio-political (and today industrialized) dictates. Socrates was a martyr of his time for his counter-establishment, counter-cultural method of turning the youth to those inherited moralized paradigms that tend to work in the service of extrinsic, political often, forms of oppression. But in Nietzsche’s view this was accomplished through idolizing reason, and demonizing the instincts. Though not in complete agreement with his rendering of Socrates, his life and method, the point is well taken. The stylistic process of becoming oneself is a process of “losing one’s way,” (insert Foucault) and with gaping mouth revert to unadulterated scripts that expunge the decadent, the toxic, but win no lottery of worth that is outwardly visible. Inwardly, epimeleia eautou (επιμέλεια εαυτού), is alarmingly settled! Finally, though not final.

My Horizon


I feel grounded, at home again. Interesting how one’s physical space can sometimes speak to the architectural design of one’s life. It was a clean, functional space, but transitional. It never felt like a home. Just somewhere to hang my coat. But this?! This is not a space, it is a place, my place, our place. Already transformative in diagnostic form, its brief life is already constitutive of battles won, and a warm, endearing heart of restitution, and hope for tomorrows to come, and with anticipatory valour pre-emptively celebratory. A horizon vastly open is charming in its beauty and flattering in its almost childish faith. Not the angst-ridden, overwhelming variety of which Nietzsche speaks when he says: “At long last the horizon appears free to us again, even if it should not be bright; at long last our ships may venture out again, venture out to face any danger; all the daring of the lover of knowledge permitted again; the sea, OUR sea, lies open again, perhaps there has never yet been such an open sea.” No. For it is not in the groundlessness experienced as that unfreedom in open possibility that I find myself. Home is grounding. But not grave-like. Roots. Roots that grow and spread through the lands, simultaneously sprouting life above ground, moving as she does towards the warmth of the bright shining light of the sun. It is all I could have ever hoped for.


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